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INTRODUCTION
Third party litigation funding (TPF), where financial corpo-
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nonrecourse loan, is attracting both controversy and capital.'
Media coverage of TPF in connection with lawsuits inspired by
the #MeToo movement and other high profile litigation, such as
the suit against Gawker Media sponsored by investor Peter
Thiel, has thrust the industry out of the shadows of the civil
litigation ecosystem and into the limelight.2 At the same time,
TPF is a fast-growing asset class in the United States and in
other nations.3 The 2016 combination of two of the largest
litigation funders in the United States, Burford Capital and
Gerchen Keller, has created a firm that, by the end of 2017, had
$3.1 billion "invested in and available for legal finance."4 TPF
firms generally receive a large premium in the event of a suc-
cessful litigation outcome, variously as a portion of the amount
recovered, a multiple of the amount advanced, or a very high
I See, e.g., Joshua Hunt, What Litigation Finance Is Really About, NEW
YORKER (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/what-
litigation-finance-is-really-about [https://perma.cc/7GQE-D9XF] (providing an
overview of the rise and proliferation of the litigation finance industry); Mattathias
Schwartz, Should You Be Allowed to Invest in a Lawsuit?, N.Y. TIMEs, at B1 (Oct.
22, 2015), https: //www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/magazine/should-you-be-al
lowed-to-invest-n-a-lawsuit.html [https: //perma.cc/L858-9UX7].
2 See, e.g., Matthew Goldstein & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, How the Finance
Industry Is Trying to CashIn on #MeToo, N.Y. TIMES, at B1 (Jan. 28, 2018) https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/01/28/business/metoo-finance-lawsuits-haras
sment.html [https://perma.cc/HG79-NGYE] (expounding on the role of settle-
ment-advance companies and traditional litigation funding operations in the
#MeToo movement); Eugene Kontorovich, Peter Thiel's Funding of Hulk Hogan-
Gawker Litigation Should Not Raise Concerns, WASH. POST (May 26, 2016), https:/
/www.washingtonpost. com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/05/26/peter-
thiels-funding- of-hulk-hogan-gawker- litigation- should-not-raise-concerns/
[https://perma.cc/4KFY-CFMB] (detailing Peter Theil's involvement in the law-
suit that forced Gawker into bankruptcy); Sam Thielman, Peter Thiel Has Backed
A Startup That Makes It Easier To Sue - And Win, GUARDIAN (Aug. 24, 2016),
https: / /www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/24/peter-thiel-legalist-
startup-gawker-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/XR3H-AV2S] (highlighting Peter
Theil's involvement with the litigation funding startup Legalist and how such
involvement has led to media scrutiny).
3 See, e.g., Drew Hasselback, The Gavel Gamble: Litigation Emerges As An
Asset Class, FIN. POST (Apr. 29, 2016), http://business.flnancialpost.com/legal-
post/the-gavel-gamble-litigation-emerges-as-an-asset-class [https://perma.cc/
K9L5-PP9H] (in Canada, "[lawsults are emerging as a distinct asset class, just like
real estate, private equity, precious metals or stocks and bonds"); Patrick M.
Jones, Third-Party Litigation FYnding In Bankruptcy Cases, BANKR. STRATEGIST
(Jan. 2013), ("[L]itigation finance is an alternative asset class that has experienced
rapid growth in the U.S. in the past decade.").
4 BURFORD CAPITAL, 2017 INTERIM REPORT 1, https://www.burfordcapital.com
/wp-content/uploads/201 7/07/BUR-27947-Interim-Report- 2017_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3KDW-US96]; see also id. at 4 (stating that "Burford's acquisi-
tion of Gerchen Keller Capital on 14 December 2016 catapulted Burford into the
role of the industry's largest fund manager").
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fixed interest rate on the amount advanced, among many
possibilities.5
TPF in the United States is divided between the commercial
and the consumer sectors.6 In the former, funding is provided
to a highly sophisticated litigant, usually a corporation, to help
pay for the attorneys and their costs in a commercial dispute.
7
In the latter, funding is provided directly to individuals, most of
whom have never engaged previously in litigation. Importantly,
consumer TPF channels money directly to the litigant, provid-
ing an important source of financial support during the pen-
dency of litigation.8 For this reason and to avoid confusion
with commercial TPF, we call this type of funding Litigant TPF
(or LTPF). Funding contracts differ in type between the two
sectors. Commercial TPF usually pays the funder a percentage
of the litigation proceeds upon resolution of the litigation.9 In
contrast, in LTPF the funder usually receives a payment based
on a monthly or annual interest charge. The ultimate payment
owed to the funder is determined by the interest rate, the
length of time to the resolution of the litigation, and some other
features explained below. 10 Our Article focuses on LTPF.
LTPF has been a significant commercial financial activity in
the United States since the late 1980s.11 Given that no LTPF
firms are publicly traded, the market is hard to measure. All
indicators are that it has grown significantly over the past
5 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 3, at 3 ("Third-party litigation finance can take
numerous forms and is limited only by the imagination of the investors and their
counterparties."); Hunt, supra note 1 (providing examples of different forms of
litigation finance and stating that "[t]he returns can be significant").
6 See generally STEVEN GARBER, ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED
STATES: ISSUES, KNOwNS, AND UNKNOwNs 1 (2010) (providing a comprehensive review
of the TPF market).
7 Id. at 13-15.
8 Id. at 9.
9 In commercial litigation finance contracts, "the financier provides immedi-
ate capital to prosecute the case in exchange for a percentage of the future recov-
ery." Joanna M. Shepherd & Judd E. Stone II, Economic Conundrums in Search of
a Solution: The Functions of Third-Party Litigation Finance, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 919,
937 (2015). But there is no "one size fits all" commercial litigation finance con-
tract. Commercial funding is diverse and includes many different types of prod-
ucts. See, e.g., Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 455, 467-471 (2012) [hereinafter Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract] (detail-
ing the unique financing structure of an idiosyncratic litigation funding contract);
Shepherd & Stone II, supra, at 941-42 (discussing the use of "first money out"
and "waterfall" payment structures in TPF).
10 See GARBER, supra note 6, at 9.
11 See Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs' Lawsuits: An Increasingly
Popular (and Legal) Business, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 57 (1999) (noting the
sudden increase in media coverage of LTPF).
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twenty years. 12 Lawcash, one of the earliest LTPF firms, began
in 2000 and by 2002 had advanced a total of more than $10
million.1 3 By contrast, a recent market survey of twenty-two
LTPF firms reported that almost 40% of them were older than
eleven years and as a group they had invested almost $500
million between 2013-2015.14 The same report disclosed that
80% of respondent firms' business was conducted in only
seven states (NY, PA, FL, NJ, IL, NV, GA), which suggests po-
tential for significant future growth in the industry. 15
Over the past ten years there has been an explosion of
scholarly commentary about LTPF, with authors approaching
it from positive and normative perspectives. 16 LTPF has drawn
attention from certain political quarters as well, with groups
associated with tort reform in the United States publishing
studies critical of both commercial and LTPF in the United
States and Europe. 17
12 See Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West
of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 55
(2004) [hereinafter Martin, Financing Plaintiffs' Lawsuits] (stating that litigation
finance "has become an industry within the last ten years").
13 See Cristina Merrill, Judgment Call Firms that Lend to Personal-Injury
Plaintiffs Take Steps to Improve Their Bad-Guy Image, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus. (Jan. 26,
2003), https: / /www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20030127/SUB/301270728/
judgment-call [https: //perma.cc/4XHG-HSA4].
14 See BRYANT PARK CAPITAL, 2016 CEO SURVEY REPORT: PRE-SETTLEMENT FUND-
ING 13 (2016) (on file with authors) [hereinafter BRYANT PARK REPORT].
15 Id. at 11.
16 See generally Ronen Avraham & Abraham Wickelgren, Third Party Litiga-
tion Funding with Informative Signals: Equilibrium Characterization and the Effects
of Admissibility (Univ. of Tex. Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. e521, 2019);
Ronen Avraham & Abraham Wickelgren, Third Party Litigation Funding-A Signal-
ing Model, 63 DEPAUL L. REv. 233 (2014) [hereinafter Avraham & Wickelgren, A
Signaling Model]; Jeremy Kidd, To Fund or Not to Fund: The Need for Second-Best
Solutions to the Litigation Finance Dilemma, 8 J.L. ECON. & POLY 613 (2012);
Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry that Has a
Place in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REv. 83 (2008); Julia H. McLaughlin,
Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REv. 615 (2007);
Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem,
99 GEO. L.J. 65 (2010); Marco de Morpurgo, A Comparative Legal and Economic
Approach to Third-Party Litigation Funding, 19 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 343
(2011); Anthony J. Sebok, Litigation Investment and Legal Ethics: What Are the
Real Issues?, 55 CAN. Bus. L.J. 11 (2014); Anthony J. Sebok, Should the Law
Preserve Party Control? Litigation Investment, Insurance Law, and Double Stan-
dards, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 833 (2015); Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim is this
Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REv. 1268 (2011).
17 See generally U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SUPPORTING SAFE-
GUARDS: EU CONSUMER ATTITUDES TOwARDs COLLECTIVE ACTIONS AND LITIGATION FUND-
ING (2017), https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/EUPaper
_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/VS3W-BYMU]; Lisa Rickard [President, U.S. Cham-
ber Inst. for Legal Reform], This Is Casino Litigation, Where We All Lose, N.Y. TIMES
(May 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/05/27/the-
ethics-of-investing-in-anothers-lawsuit/this-is-casino-litigation-where-we-all-
1136
20191 AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 1137
One of the main critiques of LTPF is that winning plaintiffs
often pay usurious interest rates to funders and that this prac-
tice often leaves them with almost nothing from the award or
settlement.18 This criticism is directed against LTPF (and not
commercial TPF) for a few reasons. The first is that the popula-
tion of users of TPF in the commercial market are, by defini-
tion, commercial actors, and, while some may be more
sophisticated than others, observers think that as a group they
do not need the same protections consumers require.19 The
second is that there is very little publicly available information
about the terms of commercial TPF, given that commercial TPF
firms do not make their rates available to the public, do not
report the details of their business practices to their sharehold-
ers (if they are publicly traded), and fight to protect the details
of their contracts and contract negotiations from adverse par-
ties in discovery.20 As a result, the focus on the cost of TPF has
really been about the cost of LTPF.
Concern over the cost of LTPF is not, however, grounded in
reliable data. Until this Article, academic and policy debate
lose [https://perma.cc/9QEY-NKYK; U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELL-
ING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: TH-RD-PARry LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES
(2009) [hereinafter U.S. CHAMBER, Selling Lawsuits], https://www.instituteforlegal
reform.com/uploads /sites/ 1 /thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PJJ2-VMC5]; U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THIRD-PARTY LITIGA-
TION FUNDING, https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/third-party-litiga-
tion-funding [https://perma.cc/7SUX-WHXZ].
18 See, e.g., Jenna Wims Hashway, Litigation Loansharks: A History of Litiga-
tion Lending and a Proposal to Bring Litigation Advances Within the Protection of
Usury Laws, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 750, 750 (2012) [hereinafter Hashway,
Litigation Loansharks] (depicting an instance of LTPF where the plaintiffs were
provided loans with interest rates "of up to 280%").
19 See Laurie A. Giordano-Vahey and Alissa M. Valentine, Advocate's View:
An Update on Non-Recourse Litigation Loans, DAILY RECORD (Oct. 14, 2015), http:/
/nydailyrecord.com/2015/10/14/advocates-view-an-update-on-recourse-litiga
tion-loans/ [https://perma.cc/573G-SJNL] ("[A] sophisticated corporation's cal-
culated decision to pay a high fee to a funding company to avoid taking the full
risk in litigating a claim does not seem unreasonable .... [But] from the perspec-
tive of an individual plaintiff... [LTPF should be] subject to higher scrutiny.").
20 See Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 718-19 (N.D. Ill.
2014). Occasionally a commercial TPF firm will describe, in general terms, the
content of a contract after an investment has been concluded. See, e.g.,
JOHNATHAN T. MOBT, THEORY AND PRACTICE IN LITIGATION RISK 10-11 (2015), http://
www.burfordcapital.com/wp- content/uploads/2015/01 /Booklet-Theory-and-
Practice.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4JE-S6QZ (describing three investments, in-
cluding one which in which Burford received "its investment back plus roughly a
2x return on that invested capital"). IMF Bentham, the world's second-largest
commercial TPF firm, "generally aims to get its investment back plus two times
the invested amount." Allison McNeely, Suing Is Canada's New Asset Class as




about LTPF has been conducted in an environment of anecdote
and speculation. A brief review of some academic work reflects
an extraordinary range of reported rates in the LTPF market.
In 2004, two articles reported that LTPF cost between
180%-425% per annum.2 1 A 2007 law review note reported
that rates of greater than 100% "were not uncommon" in the
1990s, but that rates had decreased since then.22 The 2010
RAND study noted that "there [was] no systematic empirical
information about the sizes of financing fees" for any type of
TPF, but reported anecdotal evidence of a range of 24%-60%
per annum.23 As recently as 2014, a law review article which
purported to be a survey of TPF stated that "it is not atypical for
[a TPF provider] to charge 80% interest in the first year of a loan
and up to 280% of the total loan amount."24 A 2015 law review
article that argued that TPF was overcharging its customers
suggested that TPF rates ranged between 30% to 180% per
annum, with the typical rate falling, after compounding, at
47% per annum.2 5 The 2018 New York Times article men-
tioned at the beginning of this Introduction reported LTPF in-
terest rates of "as high as" 100%.26
It is possible that rates have, on average, declined over the
past two decades. On the other hand, it is possible that con-
sumers are at the mercy of a market where rates for similar
financial products dramatically differ for no apparent reason.
The range that the published reports reflect could mirror an
extremely inefficient market, or it could be random noise
picked up by scholars, lawyers, and journalists encountering a
new business model. Without a much larger and more compre-
hensive sample, it is impossible to know. This Article is the
first comprehensive effort to analyze the behavior of the LTPF
market, including providing a measure of the cost of LTPF.
21 Yifat Shaltiel & John Cofresi, Litigation Lending for Personal Needs Act: A
Regulatory Framework to Legitimatize Third Party Litigation Finance, 58 CONSUMER
FIN. L.Q. REP. 347, 348 (2004) (425%); Martin, Financing Plaintiffs' Lawsuits,
supra note 11, at 68 (180%).
22 Courtney R. Barksdale, All That Glitters Isn't Gold Analyzing the Costs and
Benefits of Litigation Finance, 26 REv. LrrIG. 707, 728 (2007) (citing the American
Legal Finance Association website FAQs).
23 GARBER, supra note 6, at 12.
24 Terrence Cain, Third Party Funding of Personal Injury Tort Claims: Keep the
Baby and Change the Bathwater, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 11, 12 (2014)
25 Carol Langford, Betting on the Client: Alternative Litigation Funding Is an
Ethically Risky Proposition for Attorneys and Clients, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. 237, 239
(2015).
26 See Goldstein & Sflver-Greenberg, supra note 2.
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Trustworthy data on the LTPF market is more important
than ever before, given increased attention on the industry.
Media coverage of alleged abuses by the LTPF industry has
increased. 27 Media coverage both reflects and drives legislative
interest.28 Recently, some American states have enacted laws
governing LTPF. These reforms have followed two streams.
One stream, which is supported by the LTPF industry, pro-
motes transparency. Maine, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, and
Vermont have enacted laws which explicitly allow LTPF funding
for consumers with requirements designed to help the con-
sumer decide whether to contract with a funder free of undue
pressure and misinformation.29 These reforms vary in detail,
but typical provisions include notice and disclosure provisions,
standardized contract language, a minimum cancellation pe-
riod after signing, and bans on attorney referral fees.30 The
other stream, which is supported by "tort reform" pressure
groups such as the United States Chamber of Commerce, pro-
motes fixed limits on the rate of return paid by an LTPF con-
tract (usually linked to the state's usury laws). Arkansas,
Indiana, and Tennessee have passed laws that cap the pre-
mium charged to a consumer for an advance at a multiple of an
27 See, e.g., Shawn Cohen, et al., Inside the Cottage Industry That's Fleecing
NYC Taxpayers, N.Y. POST (Jan. 2, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/01/02/how-
firms-are-getting-rich-on-the-surest-money-grab-in-nyc/ [https://perma.cc/
C5KV-CKH8] (asserting that LTPF lncentivizes "bogus" lawsuits and detailing a
number of recent LTPF arrangements with high payouts); Alison Frankel, NFL
Concussion Case: Can MDL Judges Police Plaintiffs' Funding Deals?, REUTERS (Nov.
20, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-nfl/nfl-concussion-
case-can-mdl-judges-police-plaintiffs-funding-deals-idUSKBN 1DK2IE [https://
perma.cc/U9RJ-XH27] (reporting on the prevalence of LTPF in the NFL concus-
sion class action case and how the judiciary's authority may "extend[ I] to third-
party funders who've entered deals with individual plaintiffs").
28 Compare Post Editorial Board, Crack Down on New York's Legal Sharks,
N.Y. PosT (Jan. 3, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/01/03/crack-down-on-new-
yorks-legal-sharks/ [https://perma.cc/M9BC-5A98] [hereinafter N.Y. POST,
Crack Down on New York's Legal Sharks] (admonishing New York City's legisla-
ture to take action against LTPF funds based on the N.Y. Post's recent exposes),
with Bruce Golding, Lawmakers Square Off over Profitable Cottage Industry, N.Y.
POST (Jan. 15, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/01/15/lawmakers-push-back-
against-profitable-cottage-industry [https://perma.cc/2R2F-GG4Z] (reporting on
the recent legislative developments regarding LTPF).
29 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A § 12- 101 (effective Jan. 1, 2008); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-3302(1), (4) (effective Apr. 13, 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1349.55(A)-(C) (effective Aug. 27, 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A § 3-801(6)
(effective May 29, 2013); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 8, §§ 2251-60 (effective July 1, 2016).
30 See e.g., VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 8, §§ 2253-54 (effective July 1, 2016) (requiring
certain disclosures in LTPF contracts, mandating certain standard contractual
language and a minimum cancellation period of five days and prohibiting attorney
referral fees); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55(B) (requiring certain disclosures and
formatting in LTPF contracts).
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annual rate.3 1 To date, the former is unlikely to reduce the
interest rates and fees plaintiffs pay, while the latter may drive
LTPF providers out of that state's consumer market.
3 2
While scholarship about litigation financing is still grow-
ing, there is almost no empirical research on the industry
worldwide or in the American legal system.33 This research
project is the first large-scale empirical analysis of the pre- and
post-contract behavior of the LTPF market. Starting from the
common-sense premise that policymakers cannot begin to reg-
ulate a financial instrument without first understanding the
operation of the market, this research is the most comprehen-
sive empirical investigation into how the LTPF system operates
in the United States.
We have received from one of the largest consumer litiga-
tion financing firms in the United States a unique dataset that
has about 200,000 funded and unfunded American cases over
a period of ten years. The litigation funding firm has provided
us with access to all their applications for litigation funding,
which are retained electronically. Thus, we have access to the
equally large groups of funded and unfunded cases.
The data is very rich. It contains, among other things, the
name and address of the party seeking funding, the name of
the lawyer representing them, where the applicant's suit has
been filed, a brief description of the case, and the amount re-
31 See S. 882, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015) (to be codified at
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-57-109(a)(2)) (effective April 1, 2015) (maximum rate of 17%
per annum); IND. CODE § 24-4.5-3-202 (effective July 1, 2016) (maximum rate of
36% plus allowable fees); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-51-101 et seq. (effective July 1,
2015) (maximum rate of 36% per year for a maximum of three years plus one-time
fee of 10% of principal). As of June 21, 2018, New York's Assembly and Senate are
considering various proposals that would cap annual rates charged at 25%. See
Andrew Denney, NY Lawmakers Considering Bills to Regulate Consumer Litigation
FuAnding, N.Y. L.J. (May 29, 2018), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjoumal/
201 8/05/29/ny-lawmakers-considering-bills-to-regulate-consumer-litigation-
funding/ [https: //perma.cc/RQ2A-KUJS].
32 See Andrew G. Simpson, Litigation Financing Firm Exits Tennessee As New
Law Goes Into Effect, INS. J. (July 3, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/southeast/2014/07/03/333772.htm [https://perma.cc/V7UN-PHPJ] (liti-
gation funder claimed that Tennessee law left it "no choice but to cease service to
Tennessee consumers").
33 There are only two published empirical studies about the industry and they
both use data from Australia and only about 113 funded cases. David S. Abrams
& Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: A First Empirical Look at Third Party
Litigation Funding, 15 U. PENN. J. Bus. L. 1075 (2013); Daniel L. Chen, Can
Markets Stimulate Rights? On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 46 RAND J. ECON.
23 (2015); see also Jean Y. Xiao, An Empirical Examination of Consumer Litiga-
tion Funding (May 2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University),
10-13 (examining 4,403 consumer litigation finance contracts resolved between
2002-2013) [hereinafter Xlao 2017].
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quested by the applicant. More information is gathered on ap-
plications that are seriously considered for funding. For
example, the company may obtain police, hospital, and insur-
ance reports on the incident at the center of the claim, it may
conduct independent legal research to determine the likelihood
of success and the potential damage award, and the company
may also seek details concerning any liens on an award the
plaintiff might receive or historical data concerning, for exam-
ple, whether the plaintiff has ever filed for bankruptcy. In addi-
tion, the data set contains data points on the amount funded,
the monthly interest rate, the length of the case, the amount
owed when the case settles, and the amount eventually
collected.
In this Article we provide a comprehensive analysis of
funders' modus operandi. Our main findings are as follows:
first, that the underwriting procedures adopted by the funders
are robust, in that only approximately half of the funding appli-
cations are approved. This finding suggests that funding may
serve as a second layer of case selection (after the initial layer of
the plaintiff attorney's own decision whether to take a case).
Second, funders are cautious about investing too deeply in
a case. The ratio between average case valuation and average
funding amounts is extremely large. Funders invest about 7%
of the estimated case value. This may be an artifact of the fact
that the funder's internal case valuations may not truly reflect
settlement value, but even so, the large difference indicated
suggests that funded plaintiffs still have a very strong interest
in the outcome of their case even after funding, which is a
rational investment strategy for the funder. One of the criti-
cisms of consumer litigation finance is that it leaves the con-
sumer with an inconsequential recovery after the conclusion of
her litigation; the data we have collected suggests this is un-
likely to be true in most cases.
34
Third, the data suggests that 12% of the consumers who
receive funding receive it for free, either because they pay noth-
ing to the funder at the resolution of their cases, i.e. a complete
34 See, e.g., Cain, supra note 24, at 12 ("On the other hand, if [the consumer]
does recover something from her lawsuit, she could very well end up owing... as
much as 280% more than what she borrowed. If she recovers less than what she
owes the [litigation financing company], she will have to turn her entire recovery
over to the LFC, leaving her with nothing.") (footnote omitted). This claim has
been repeated in popular media coverage of consumer TPF. See N.Y. PoST, Crack
Down on New York's Legal Sharks, supra note 28 ("[Pilaintiffs whose cases would
do well in any court - 9/11 first-responders; brain-injured ex-NFL pros - can
wind up with pennies on the dollar.").
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default (10%), or they pay only an amount that reflects all or
some of the original advance without paying any interest fees
on it.
35
Fourth, we show that consumer litigant funding pricing is
complex and opaque. The advertised or "headline" rate that
consumers first encounter suggests an annual return to the
funder of less than 50% per annum, but, as we show, the
average contract between the consumer and the funder gives
the funder the right to a median return of 115% per annum.
The final amount due to the funder upon contract is based on a
number of variables, including the advertised interest rate, the
type of compounding, the inclusion of interest buckets and
minimum interest periods, and the addition of nonrecourse
fees, which are advanced and treated as contingent costs paid
only by clients that pay back their amount due.
Fifth, while the data suggests that the median amount due
to the funder reflects a return of about 115%, the median ac-
tual annual return is approximately 43% of the amount funded
once one takes into account defaults and haircuts.36 Our data
is the first comprehensive measurement of the cost of con-
sumer litigation finance. The results we have produced about
the embedded interest rate, as high as they might seem, are
significantly lower than some of the speculations introduced by
critics of consumer litigation finance in debates over reform
and regulation.3 7 The embedded interest rate that we have
identified-43% per annum-is close to the statutory rate cap
that some members of the consumer litigation finance industry
accepted in negotiation with industry critics in Indiana-that
is, 36% per annum plus approximately 10% in additional
fees.38 Of course, the clients who pay back the full amount due
35 Twelve percent is less than some funders have reported. See Memorandum
from William N. Lund, Superintendent, Bureau of Consumer Credit Protection,
Department of Professional and Financial Regulation, State of Maine, to Senator
Peter Bowman, Senate Chair, Representative Sharon Anglin Treat, House Chair,
Joint Standing Committee on Insurance and Financial Services (Apr. 6, 2010) at 2
[hereinafter 2010 Report to Maine I & FS Committee] ("According to officials from
the 2 companies currently registered to do business in Maine, between 20% and
30% of all cases result in no funds to the plaintiff, and therefore in those cases, no
funds are received by the funding provider.").
36 We use medians and not means because the data is skewed to the right.
The means would have been higher in most of the reported statistics in this paper.
37 See supra text accompanying notes 16-21.
38 See IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-3-202(k) (2018):
A provider is permitted to charge the following for each transaction:
a 36% per annum fee of the amount; a fee not exceeding an annual
rate of 36% of the funded amount; a servicing charge not exceeding
an annual rate of 7% of the funded amount; and a one-time docu-
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(or sometimes even above it)-roughly one-third of all clients-
will find little comfort in the fact that so many others pay less
than they owe the funder due to defaults and haircuts.39
Sixth, the data suggests that there is significant ex post
adjustment of the portion of the litigation proceeds recovered
by the funder. A little bit more than half of the transactions
between the funder and the consumer were subject to what we
call a "haircut"-where the consumer repaid the advance but
then repaid a lower return on the funder's investment than the
consumer was contractually obliged to pay. The frequency and
the size of the haircuts explain why observers have reported
very high rates of return in the consumer funding industry and
we observed much lower rates of return-because there is often
a dynamic repricing of the investment after the resolution of
the consumer's case that was hidden from observers who only
observed the initial contractual interest rate. This result, in
turn, suggests further avenues of inquiry, including, for exam-
ple, (i) why do some consumers receive a haircut from the
funder, and (ii) to the extent that the haircut is a product of
negotiation between the consumer's lawyer and the funder,
what ethical obligations, if any, does the lawyer assume with
regard to securing (or attempting to secure) the haircut?
The data we have provided is important for any policy dis-
cussion. We think that our results at minimum support re-
forms designed to make pricing transparent by removing
complex pricing mechanisms such as "interest buckets" and
minimum interest periods described below.
ment fee not to exceed $250 for the transaction with a funded
amount of less than $5,000 or not to exceed $500 for a funded
amount of at least $5,000.
One consumer litigation funding trade organization, the Alliance for Responsible
Consumer Legal Funding (ARC), supported the Indiana law. See Landmark Legal
Funding Laws in Vermont and Indiana Set the Standard for Consumer Protection,
PR NEWSWIRE (June 27, 2016), http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/
landmark-legal-funding-laws-in-vermont-and-indiana-set-the-standard-for-con
sumer-protection-300290234.html [https: //perma.cc/KNP5-QB581.
39 Eyal Zamlr, Drowning in a Bucket: Nonrecourse Loans for Litigants,
JOTWELL (Feb. 25, 2019) (reviewing Ronen Avraham & Anthony Sebok, An Empir-








The data originally contained 203,307 funding requests
filed by 113,298 different individuals involved in 120,230 dif-
ferent cases. After masking and cleaning it we ended up having
191,144 funding requests filed by 106,800 individuals involved
in 111,982 different cases.
40
The vast majority of individuals in our dataset (102,383
individuals (96%)) brought just one case, while 3815 (3.5%)
individuals brought two different cases. The remaining 0.5%
brought on average about 3.5 different cases.
When a client brings a case, she sometimes files for more
than one funding request. For example, of the 96% of clients
who brought just one case, 75% filed one funding request, 13%
filed two funding requests, and another 12% filed on average
5.3 requests. To keep things simple, we combined those re-
quests and work at the case level. Therefore, we were left with
111,982 pre-settlement consumer funding cases coming from
106,800 different consumers. Funding requests come from cli-
ents whose average age is 42 years. They live in every single
state in the United States. 32% of funding cases come from
New York. Other significant origin states include Florida and
New Jersey, about 9% each, as well as California, Georgia,
Pennsylvania, and Texas, about 4 to 5% each.
Chart 1 presents the distribution of cases per year. It
shows that the number of cases has peaked around 10,000
cases annually.
40 We excluded cases where funding was extended to lawyers. These cases
are fundamentally different-both in terms of the amount funded and interest
rate charged-from cases brought by regular clients. Therefore, we dropped 455
lawyer-clients with 1,471 cases and 1,677 funding requests. For consumer-cli-
ents, there are three types of business lines. The most important one is called
"pre-settlement." These funding requests come from clients who request funding
before their case is settled. There are 195,602 such requests. Next, there are
6,028 "post-settlement" requests. These requests come from clients who have
secured a settlement or a verdict in their favor and, while waiting for the money to
arrive, they need some funding. Next, there are 4,458 requests where the funder
bought older receivables from other funders. Because buying old receivables and
post-settlement funding seem to us to be different types of business lines, we
dropped both types of these requests. We also dropped 264 pending cases and




CHART 1-NUMBER OF CASES PER YEAR
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Each funding request must undergo a multistage process.
Possible statuses in our dataset for such requests include:
Completed, Funded, Refused, Closed Before Review, and De-
nied After Review.4 1 Generally, about a little bit more than one-
in-two cases (52%) are not funded, of which about 60% are
denied outright and the remainder are denied after an under-
writing process.42 Chart 2 presents these results.
41 In the funder's dataset, Completed is coded as Settled. However, that is
confusing when we start talking about the underlying case being settled. We
therefore used Completed. In addition, there are two other statuses-Withdrawn
and Still In Review-but these were too few to matter, so we ignore them.
42 Data from Bryant Part Capital's report suggests that the average approval
rate in the industry is about 57%. However, there seems to be a lot of variation, as
45% of the respondents had an approval rate under 50%. BRYANT PARK REPORT,
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was not refused).4 6 Of these cases, 16% were still being liti-
gated at the end of the period, or there has not been a settle-
ment at the end of the period (these are coded as "Funded").
The remaining 38,318 cases (83%) had been "completed" and
money was paid back to the funder. Most of our analysis below
will focus on these closed-claims completed cases.
We start by inquiring into the number of days between the
completed cases' various milestones. For the completed cases,
the median number of days from the date of the accident to the
date the client first contacted the company is 308. The median
number of days between that date and the date of first funding
is ten (future funding requests for the same case were
processed much faster because the details about the case were
already known). During the ten days in which the funder
processes the first funding request, it collects information
about the client, the lawyer representing him, the court where
the case is handled, and basic facts about the underlying case.
For example, if the case involves a car accident, the funder
documents a short description of facts surrounding the inci-
dent. The funder also records the injuries the client suffered,
including whether he suffered fractures or needed any sur-
geries, the length of the medical treatment he went through,
and the amount of time the client was out of work. Following
this preliminary investigation, the funder then collects data on
the defendant's insurance carrier, its rating, and the scope of
coverage the defendant holds. Lastly, the funder estimates the
underlying case value including the lost wages and medical
expenses involved. In our dataset, we have case evaluation for
84% of the cases in which requests were funded or completed.
The median (average) case valuation is $36,000 ($183,000).4 7
Once the funds are extended to clients, it takes another
417 days (median) for the case to be completed.48 Table 1
summarizes the results.
46 Recall the difference between cases and requests, as more than one request
can be funded in a single case.
47 It is a limitation of the data set that the funder does not record the gross
proceeds recovered by those clients with completed cases who recovered some-
thing (which comprise 90% of all completed cases). See infra Table 7. There is no
way, therefore, to evaluate the accuracy of the case valuations. By way of compar-
ison, a recent study of New York City tort litigation disclosed that, on average, the
proceeds paid in both settled cases and adjudicated cases was about $90,000.
See Eric Helland, Daniel Klerman, Brendan Dowling & Alexander Kappner, Con-
tingent Fee Litigation in New York City, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1971, 1985 (2017).
48 Compare to 15.7 months (about 471 days) reported in BRYANT PARK REPORT,
supra note 14, at 14.
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TABLE 1-STAGES OF FUNDING
Time between: Median # of Days:
Accident to contact 308 days
Contact to 1 funding 10 days
1st funding to completion 417 days
C. The Return on the Investment
The total amount of money funded by the funder also va-
ried from case to case. The average total amount funded for the
38,318 cases that were completed in our dataset was $6,903,
and the median was $2,250. 4 9 The "Amount Due" is the
amount owed to the funder when the case settles. The average
Amount Due for the 38,318 cases that were completed was
$16,964 and the median was $4,849. These numbers reflect a
markup of 145% and 115%, respectively.5 0 However, the
Amount Due was not-for various reasons discussed below-
always paid back in full. The "Amount Paid Back" is the
amount that the client actually paid back to the funder.5 1 The
average Amount Paid Back to the funder is $10,740 and the
median is $3,380. These numbers reflect a markup of 56% and
50%, respectively. Chart 4 summarizes:
49 Compare to an average of $3,781 reported in the Bryan Park Capital Re-
port. I&L
50 We calculated markup in the following way: (amount due/amount funded)-
1.
51 As noted above, the funder records only the amount paid by the consumer
to the funder-and not the gross or net proceeds in the underlying case. As a
result, it is not possible to know, on average, the percentage of the consumer's





be twelve times that number, or about 38%, and, for the length
of the funding about 45%, as the median length is about four-
teen months. In other words, the average consumer, who
might not look carefully at the fine print of the funding con-
tract, might reasonably expect that the cost of funding would
be 38% per annum, and, if she knew that the median length of
a case to resolution after funding was fourteen months, that
the total cost of her funding would be 1.45 times her advance.
We call this the expected interest rate. But the expected inter-
est rate is not the same as the interest rate that the consumer
commits herself to pay upon contracting with the funder.
There is a puzzling difference between the actual (or embedded)
interest rate in the contract (about 115%) and the expected
interest rate (about 45%).
To resolve this puzzle, the next section explains the under-
the-hood of the funding transactions. It starts by explaining
the exact way the interest rates are calculated. Then it de-
scribes various novel features used by funders such as mini-
mum interest period and interest buckets. Lastly, it covers the
way the fees work in these funding requests.
D. The Determinants of the Effective Interest Rate
1. Compounding
There are three types of interest rates offered to the clients.
The most basic one is called "simple" and has no compounding
elements in it. If a client received $1,000 with a 3% interest
rate, it means that after a year-or twelve months-he would
owe 36%, which translates to $360 and therefore to a total debt
of $1,360. Similarly, after fourteen months, (which is the me-
dian time a case in is completed) he would owe 42%, which
translates to a total of $1,420. We refer to the 42% interest rate
as the expected interest rate. However, less than about 4% of
the completed cases were funded with a "simple" interest rate.
In 8% of the completed cases, the interest rate was com-
pounded annually, meaning that at the end of the year the
interest is added to the principal before the next monthly inter-
est rate applies. Thus, in our example above, after a year the
client would still owe $1,360, and yet after fourteen months
she would owe $1,443. However, by far the most prevalent type
of funding is one where the interest rate is compounded on a
monthly basis. Indeed, in about 88% of the completed cases,
the interest is compounded on a monthly basis. This means
that, in our example above, after one year our client would owe
$1426, and after fourteen months she would owe $1,513.
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This means that disclosure of the compounding type is
crucial for clients' welfare. Clients who do not understand that
their funding is compounded monthly, as might well be the
case, will end up paying not the 42% expected interest on a
fourteen-month funding, but rather 51%. Table 2 summarizes:
TABLE 2-THE IMPACT OF COMPOUNDING TYPES ON
HYPOTHETICAL AMOUNT DUE
(Assuming: $1,000 funding, 3% monthly rate,
14 months length)
% of Amt. Total
Amt. Due Interest
Type of Completed Amter 12 eDue 1 Ftee
Interest Cases Funded tAfter 14
in This Way Months
Period
42%
Simple 4% $1,360 $1,420 (Expected
Interest
Rate)
Compounded 8% $1,360 $1,443 44%
Annually
Compounded 88% $1,425.70 $1,513 51%
Monthly I T$ I I _ I
As a side note, we observe that in our example, we as-
sumed all types of funding come at a 3% monthly interest rate.
However, the average monthly interest is not identical between
the types but rather varies by type. Cases compounded
monthly are charged on average the highest interest rate-
3.18%; those compounded annually-2.50%; and those not
compounded at all-2.16%.
2. Minimum Interest Period and Interest Buckets
Most cases feature a minimum number of months for
which interest will be charged, regardless of the actual length
of the funding. For example, a Minimum Interest Period (MIP)
of three months means that monthly interest will be charged
for the first three months even if the money has been paid back
within two months. In addition, most cases have another very
similar feature called Interest Buckets (IB), which represents
the intervals (in months) beyond the MIP for which interest will
be charged, even if the money was paid back at some point
during the interval. For example, an IB of three months means
that money paid back within ten months will still be charged
interest as if it were paid back after twelve months. Often our
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dataset features an MIP that equals zero and then a positive IB.
In that case the IB starts from day one. Thus, MIP is interest-
ing in and of itself only when it is different from zero and is not
equal to the lB. Otherwise, these two features converge to one.
Overall only about 10% of our completed cases do not feature
one or both of these. Observe that these two features are simi-
lar to early payment penalties: clients pay an extra fee for not
paying back at the IB exit stations. We will come back to this
point below.
For the monthly compounding, the median MIP is three
months, and every other IB is also three months; for the annual
compounding, it is six and six, and for the no compounding, it
is three and one months, respectively. The larger IB or MIP are,
the more profits the funder makes. Chart 5 presents the
results.
CHART 5-MINIMUM INT. PERIOD AND INT. BUCKETS (MEDIANS)
8% of cornfleted cases
88% of con leted cases <4% of completed cases
C' - -.. I j -
Annually Monthly Simple
Min. Int. Period Int. Buckets
Chart 5 shows that for simple interest (representing only
less than 4% of the completed cases), the median MIP was
three months and the median IB was one month. For the an-
nually compounded funding (representing 8% of the cases), the
median MIP and IB were both six months long. Lastly, for the
monthly compounded funding (representing 88% of the cases),
the median MIP and IB were three months.
To demonstrate the impact of the buckets (MIP and IB) on
the amount due, we present in Table 6 the impact of two repre-
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sentative IBs (three months and six months) on the amount
due for a $1,000 funding over a period of fourteen months.
53
TABLE 3-THE IMPACT OF INTEREST BUCKETS ON
HYPOTHETICAL AMOUNT DUE
(Assuming: $1,000 funding, 3% monthly rate,
14 months length)
With No IB With IB=3 With IB=6TpofTtlTotal Total
Compounding Amt. Amt. t Amt I t.
Interest Due Rate Due Rate Due RateRate Rate Rate
Simple $1,420 42% $1,450 45% $1,540 54%
Annual $1,443 44% $1,486 49% $1,624 62%
Monthly $1,510 51% $1,558 56% $1,702 70%
In Table 3 above, we suggested that clients who do not
understand the difference between simple interest and
monthly compounding will be surprised to learn that they will
pay 51% instead of the expected 42% on a fourteen-month
$1,000 funding with 3% interest rate. Table 4 below shows
that not understanding in addition the meaning of a six-month
bucket might surprise the client even more, for she would have
to pay 70% on that same funding, almost 30% more than the
expected interest rate she would have paid with simple interest
and no buckets-42%.
3. Fees
Another way in which clients pay funders is through fees.
The fee is a contingent one, paid if and when the client pays
money back to the funder. Thus, in effect, the fee amount is
added to original amount funded, only that the client never
receives this amount-it stays with the funder. As was noted
above, the putative rationale for a fee is that the funder has to
spend money upfront to determine whether to fund a case.
Why this is not simply counted as overhead that the interest
rate charged is supposed to cover is unclear, but there are
other consumer finance industries, such as the residential
mortgage industry, that charge fees in a similar way. Unlike
the residential mortgage industry, however, only a subset of
the applicants whose applications are processed pay the
processing fee, since the fee is paid ex post. The only appli-
53 To make the calculation easier, we assume that the MIP is either identical
to 1B or is equal to zero. This assumption allows us to use just the lB.
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cants who actually pay the funder a fee are those applicants
whose cases are funded and produce a recovery larger than the
amount funded. In effect, the funder absorbs the cost of fully
or partially vetting applicants it rejects, as well as applicants it
accepts but whose cases yield no return, as overhead.
In other words, only "winners" pay the fee, while "losers"
get their fee waived. More to our point is the fact that since the
fees are not "paid" until after a client knows he is a winner, they
are treated as an advance, and the cost of the advance is com-
pounded at the same terms the original funding is com-
pounded. 54 The most frequent fee for the first funding request
in a completed case is $250; 54% of the completed cases were
charged this fee. A fee of $350 often follows this (24% were
charged this fee). Then, a fee of $150 (18% were charged this
fee). Recall, however, that many cases have more than one
funding request. In these cases, a $75 charge usually accom-
panies any additional request for funding. Chart 6 presents
the average total fee paid in completed cases per the number of
requests.











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
54 There is another type of fee that is not compounded. This fee covers actual
small costs (such as FedEx, etc.) that the funder paid to external entities for their
services. This fee is not included in the analysis.
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All in all, in the completed cases in our dataset the average
fee paid was $308 on an average of $6,919 amount funded,
which is about 4.5%. The median fee was $250, which
amounts to 11% of the $2,250 median amount funded. But
both the 4.5% and the 11% figures are misleading. In practice,
the fee varies by the size of the amount funded. Thus, when we
calculate the ratio of the fee to amount funded in every single
case, we find that the median (average) ratio of the total fees to
the amount funded is an astonishing 12.5% (15%).
This fee, recall, is compounded with the rest of the amount
funded. Therefore, we can translate it to an effective interest
rate. Table 4 demonstrates the impact of this fee on the inter-
est rate the client would have ended up paying had the funder
charged him an equivalent higher interest rate instead of a fee.
To make it tractable we present the results just for cases that
were compounded on a monthly basis, which is the most preva-
lent type of compounding. Table 4 thus copies the last line
from Table 3 and adds a 12.5% fee to the amount funded.
TABLE 4-THE IMPACT OF FEES ON HYPOTHETICAL AMOUNT DUE
(Assuming: $1,000 Funding, 3% monthly rate,
14 months length, $150 fee)
With No IB With IB=3 With IB=6
Type of Amt Total Amt Total Total
Interest Fees i Due Int. Due Int. Due It.
Rate Rate Rate
Compounded None $1,510 51% $1,558 56% $1,702 70%
Monthly
Compounded 15% $1,698.75 70% $1,753 75% $1,914 91%
Monthly
Recall that with a simple interest the expected interest rate
paid on a fourteen-month funding with no buckets was 42%.
Table 4 shows that once fees are added to the calculation the
median case with a six-month bucket is effectively charged
91%, which is 2.16 times the simple interest rate of 42%.
Lastly, recall that we started this section with the puzzling
question of why there is a markup of 115%. In this section we
were able to explain how one might get to 91% over the median
period. However, we used lB and MIP of six months, while the
prevalent ones for monthly compounded interest are actually
only three months. Therefore, we are unable to explain the
entire gap. The remaining difference might be due to averaging
and rounding error in the various steps we have taken. For
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example, we have used a monthly interest rate of 3%. Had we
used the median interest rate in our dataset, which is 3.2%, we
would have gotten to 99% instead of the 91% mentioned in
Table 4.
However, recall from Table 3 that the amount paid back
was much lower than the amount due. Whereas the median
amount due was 115% higher than the median amount
funded, the median amount paid back was about 50% higher.
This large haircut is explained in more detail in the next
section.
4. Haircuts
Of the 38,318 cases completed in the dataset, in 10% of the
cases the client paid nothing. The reasons for a $0 payment to
the funder are various. The client may have lost the case or
accepted a voluntary dismissal. Or the money she received
from the defendants may have been insufficient to cover out-
standing liens against her, including her own attorney's liens
for costs and expenses.55 In an additional 2% of the cases, the
funder received a positive amount which was equal to or lower
than the amount funded. In these cases, there was a positive
recovery (either a judgment or a settlement) but, for reasons
not disclosed in the data (e.g. liens, etc.), there was nothing left
to pay the premium component of the return based on the
embedded interest rate. In contrast, in the remaining 88% of
the cases, the client paid back more than the amount she was
funded, which means the funder made some profit. In a little
more than half of those cases, the funder recovered less than
the amount due, whereas in a little bit less than half it recov-
ered the amount due or even more. Chart 7 provides more
details.
55 As was noted in the 2010 Report to Maine I & FS Committee, supra note
35, at 3, "large competing liens and debts owed by the consumer (such as medical
provider liens, back child support, back taxes or separate civil judgments against
the plaintiff) that must also be paid out of any recovery and that have priority
















double, since the embedded interest rate for the cases in chart
7c (the haircut cases) is almost double the embedded interest
rate for the cases in chart 7d (the full payment cases).5 7
In Table 4 we saw that, due to compounded interest, buck-
ets, and fees, the amount due by the client in an average case
translates to an annual interest rate of 78%, which, given the
median length of a funding in our dataset (fourteen months),
would yield a return on each of the funder's investments of
91%. However, as Chart 7c shows, even though the funder
made some profit 88% of the time, in almost half (49%) of the
overall cases the funder received less than it was entitled to
receive per the funding agreement.
We could not tell from the data why the funder accepted
less than the client contractually owed it in these cases. It may
have been because, although the client's case was settled for a
positive amount-large enough to cover the repayment of the
advance and some of the amount due-it was not large enough
to cover all of the amount due. Another likely explanation is
that, although the client received sufficient net proceeds from
the resolution of her case to cover the amount due, the pro-
ceeds were less than she and her lawyer anticipated, and there-
fore the funder voluntarily agreed to forego its legal right to full
payment of the amount due. This is what we have called the
haircuts to the amount due.
The cumulative effect of these haircuts is significant. Re-
call from Chart 4 that, after accounting for the risk of a com-
plete default and no return on investment at all, the funder
made an average of 50% on the median case, whereas, had the
funder been able to receive the amount due in all the cases
where the client fulfilled her agreement with the funder (the
embedded interest rate), the funder would have received 115%
in the median case.
This means that those clients who do not receive any hair-
cut (39% of the clients) cross-subsidize the clients who default
(10% of all clients), who pay no premium for their advance (2%
of all clients), or who receive the haircuts (49% of the success-
ful clients). Those who pay "full freight" generate the cross-
subsidy via the features of compounded interest (buckets and
fees), so that in effect the funder earns an interest rate of
500/o-after accounting for defaults and haircuts-in fourteen
months.
57 Perhaps the haircuts are nothing more than proof of the adage, "if some-
thing looks too good to be true, it probably is."
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The number 50% is interesting because it is so close to the
expected simple interest rate of 45%. The posted median inter-
est rate of 3.2% monthly translates to a 38% annual simple
interest rate, which, given the median length of a funding in
our dataset (fourteen months), would yield (assuming no com-
pounding, buckets, fees, etc.) an average return on each of the
funder's investments of 45%.
In other words, through a very complicated and circuitous
process the funder ends up with a return on its capital that is
quite similar to what he would have received in a regime in
which every client took out a recourse loan at a simple 3.2% per
month without any compounding, minimum interest periods,
interest buckets, fees, or haircuts.58 It also represents an an-
nual cost of capital (43%) to the consumer that is higher than
most forms of borrowing available to consumers, although it is
still relatively less expensive than other forms of nonrecourse
consumer lending, such as payday lending.
E. Law Firms
There are 20,125 different law firms in our dataset. Of
those, 10,997 law firms (55%) brought just one case. The rest
are repeat players who brought more than one case. Specifi-
cally, 16% brought two cases, 8% brought three cases, 4%
brought four cases, etc. Overall, 90% of the law firms brought
fewer than ten cases. At the other end of the distribution, we
found that one law firm brought 2,317 cases; another firm
brought 1,035 cases; six more firms brought between 500 to
1,000 cases; and 123 firms brought between 100 and 500
cases.
We were interested in studying whether the repeat players
are different from the one-timers. To do that, we compared the
10,997 law firms that brought only one case, the 9,126 firms
that brought between 2-1,000 cases, and the two "mega re-
peaters" that brought over 1,000 cases each to the funder. We
called the first group the "one-timers," the second group the
58 Our findings are consistent with the results drawn from a much smaller
study. See Xiao 2017 supra note 33, at 103, 118, 135. That study found that
funders encountered a default rate of approximately 8% and took haircuts in
about 47% of all completed cases-rates almost identical to our results. Xiao's
results differ from ours in certain aspects. The average duration of the cases in
her study was 11.4 months and the average gain relative to the amount funded,
net defaults, and haircuts was 58%. Id. at 103. Our results for the median case
are fourteen months and 50%. It is striking, however, that despite the difference
in the average length of time of the advance extended by funders, the net average
gain for funders in both studies is almost identical.
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clients are half of the rates obtained by all the other clients
represented by the other firms. As a result, the mega-players'
clients could only get so much of an ex post rate reduction
before it reached zero. But the mega-firms' clients still got
haircuts more often than clients represented by the repeat
players or the one-timers. As Table 5 illustrates, the mega-
players' clients got haircuts in 59% of their completed cases,
compared to 48% for all the other firms' clients.
TABLE 5-DEFAULTS AND HAIRCUTS BY LAW FIRM TYPE
(38,318 Complete Cases)
One-Timers Players Mega-Players
Complete Default 15% 10% 8%
Amount Funded Not Recovered 3% 2% 2%
Amount Due Not Recovered 48% 48% 59%
Amount Due Recovered 29% 34% 25%
More Than 100% Recovered 5% 5% 5%
Recall that in Chart 4 we reported that for all cases, the
median effective rate was 50% and the embedded rate was
115%. Not surprisingly, the repeat players' clients, who made
up 88% of the cases in Chart 4, resemble the median case in
many respects. We observe, however, that the cases brought
by the clients of one-timers and the mega-players behaved very
differently than the median or the repeat players' clients' cases.
First, the one-timers' cases turned out to be poor performers
for the funder. The gap between the expected return (the
amount due) and the actual return (the amount paid back) was
huge (113% vs. 17%). This was the result of two factors. First,
a relatively large number of defaults (and negative capital re-
coveries), and second, large haircuts, frequently given. The
mega-players also did not generate high effective rates for the
funder, either-only 25%. But the funder probably saw these
cases as good performers. The default rate (and negative capi-
tal recoveries) for the clients of the mega-players was almost
half that of the clients of the one-timers. And, although hair-
cuts were given generously (59% of all completed cases), the
funder still got much of what it had expected, since the gap
between the embedded rate and the effective rate (62% vs. 25%)
was relatively narrow compared to the clients of the one-timers.
The analysis above leads us to hypothesize that a poor
outcome for a first-time client turns some lawyers into one-
timers. The funder may not want to deal with a lawyer who has
brought it a case that defaulted or needed a large haircut. It is
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also possible that a lawyer whose funded client defaulted or
who needed a large haircut might shy away from encouraging
other clients to pursue funding. Mega-players are the flip-side
of the one-timers. The funder had such a good experience with
the mega-firms' clients that they offer multiple benefits to their
clients. First, the mega-players' clients are significantly more
likely to be approved for funding; second, they receive signifi-
cantly better terms ex ante, and third, they are significantly
more likely to receive a haircut once they complete a case. The
cases the mega-firms bring are good enough, in fact, that the
funder finds it profitable to give their clients a large discount on
the price of funding compared to the rest of the cases they
fund.
One possibility is that mega-players get different types of
cases and this is why their performance is different. However,
although we found that mega-players are more likely to bring
auto accident cases, nothing in our analysis changes. Xiao
(2017) hypothesizes that there is some evidence that "a longer
financier-law firm relationship duration is associated with a
lower absolute return, a lower return ratio, and a lower interest
rate" than the default rate of cases brought by one-timers.59
Our result is consistent with this hypothesis, since it is likely
that the mega-players have a long-term relationship with the
funder. It is possible that repetitious, routinized interactions
between law firms and funders create higher degrees of trust
that are reflected in higher approval rates. It is equally likely
that repeat interactions result in lower screening costs and
long-term relationship incentives that allow funders to lower
the cost of funding ex ante.60
II
A REVIEW OF THE RESULTS
This Article provides numerous insights into the practice of
consumer litigant funding that answer a few questions and
may help shape future policy debate.
First, we show that consumer litigant funding is based on
underwriting criteria that result in a significant number of ap-
plications being screened out and rejected.6 1 While these re-
sults do not, in themselves, indicate that the cases accepted by
LTPF funders are meritorious, they indicate that funders are
59 Xiao 2017, supra note 33, at 124.
60 Id. at 114 (discussing research on relationship lending which suggests that
duration is correlated with reduced interest costs).
61 See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
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exercising a certain degree of screening in the underwriting/
selection process. As other commentators have noted, LTPF
providers "focus on basic information about the lawsuit" and
"the strength of the consumer's case" when deciding whether to
reject the application.62 As a matter of economics, it would
make sense for a funder to take steps to screen potential law-
suit investments in favor of those they reasonably believe are
stronger, both because they profit from screening better cases
and because they can further profit from credibly signaling to
adverse parties that the lawsuit they face is credible.63 The fact
that, in our sample set, the funder rejected more than half of
the cases presented to it is consistent with this prediction.
Tort reform groups and some scholars have argued that
LTPF will fuel frivolous litigation.64 The tort reform argument
has not held up well under serious academic scrutiny.6 5 This
Article does not directly engage this debate, although our re-
sults do provide additional reasons to be skeptical of the tort
reformers' claim. Beyond showing the second level of screen-
ing, our results cut also against the claim that a litigant who
was not genuinely motivated to file a claim would be induced to
file a frivolous claim by the prospect of funding.66 Recall that
funding applications were filed 308 days after the (putative)
injury.67 Recall as well that we found that funders rejected
slightly more cases than they accepted.68 Although we do not
have data on when clients filed their lawsuits, many of them
may have filed them less than ten months after they were in-
jured. For these clients, it would be far-fetched to conclude
that a 50% chance of receiving $2,250 many months later
would motivate them to visit a lawyer.69 The more plausible
62 Paige Marta Skiba & Jean Xiao, Consumer Litigation Funding: Just Another
Form of Payday Lending?, 80 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117, 123 (2017) ("The finan-
cier assesses the strength of the consumer's case by looking at factors such as
potential damages.... .").
63 See Avraham & Wickelgren, A Signaling Model, supra note 16, at 248.
64 See Sasha Nichols, Access to Cash, Access to Court: Unlocking the Court-
room Doors with Third-Party Litigation Finance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 197, 228
(2015) ("[Businesses fear that] giving potential plaintiffs and litigators more money
will 'permit[] [them] to offload risk' and encourage plaintiffs and attorneys to fie
more lawsuits, many of which would be frivolous.") (second and third alterations
in the original) (citing U.S. CHAMBER, Selling Lawsuits, supra note 17, at 5); Jeremy
Kidd, Modeling the Likely Effects of Litigation Financing, 47 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1239
(2016).
65 See Shepherd & Stone II, supra note 9, at 950 (stating that the claim "that
financing encourages frivolous litigation.., is easy to dispatch").
66 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
67 See supra Table 1.
68 See supra Chart 2.
69 See supra notes 46, 49 and accompanying text.
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conclusion to draw from our results is that clients decide to file
lawsuits for reasons that have nothing to do with funding
(which they may not even be aware of when they first meet with
a lawyer) and then make the decision to apply for funding when
they are under financial pressure.
70
Second, we show that consumer litigant funding pricing is
complex and opaque. The final amount due to the funder upon
contract is based on a number of variables, including the ad-
vertised interest rate, the type of compounding, the inclusion of
interest buckets and minimum interest periods, and the addi-
tion of nonrecourse fees, which are advanced and treated as
contingent costs paid only by clients that paid back their
amount due.7 1 The implications of this finding are potentially
quite significant. It suggests that consumers seeking litigation
funding may benefit from less opaque contract terms even in
states that have called for full disclosure of the interest rate.
Others have already noted that LTPF contracts are more
opaque than payday loan contracts, a form of subprime lending
to which LTPF has been compared.72 Skiba and Xiao observe
that the contingent nature of the outcome-the very thing that
justifies the relatively high price paid by the consumer for the
advance he receives, and which separates it from a loan-
makes it much harder for the consumer to comprehend and
compare an LTPF contract to a loan.73 We would add to this
that a further source of potential consumer confusion is the
specific way that these contingent contracts have been drafted.
The employment of compounded interest, interest buckets, and
minimum interest periods, and the addition of contingent so-
called "processing" fees take a consumer who is already un-
likely to rationally evaluate the cost of the advance and in-
crease his potential misunderstanding.74
70 In fact, LTPF might discourage frivolous litigation. Were a client to find a
lawyer to accept a frivolous case, the rejection by the funder a few months later
might serve as a negative signal to the plaintiff or his lawyer and this in return
might cause him to drop the case or agree to a low-ball offer. See Xiao 2017, supra
note 33, at 10, 18-19 (discussing the impact of funding on settlement activity).
71 Giordano-Vahey & Valentine, supra note 19 (discussing nonrecourse litiga-
tion loans); see supra subparts D.1, D.2.
72 Sklba & Xiao, supra note 62, at 127-28.
73 Id. at 127 ("[Flunding's relationship to lawsuits hides its impact on con-
sumers' cash flow due to the effects of salience, differential mental accounting,
and lack of the pain of payment.").
74 Many people lack an understanding of numeracy (that is, "the capacity to
do a simple calculation related to compounding of interest rates"), inflation, and
risk diversification. Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, The Economic Impor-
tance of Financial Literacy: Theory and Evidence, 52 J. ECON. LITERATURE 5, 10-12
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The comparison with payday lending raises interesting
questions about the evolution of the TPF industry, which has,
generally speaking, followed different contract models in its
commercial and consumer branches. As noted in the Intro-
duction, a commercial TPF advance typically entitles the
funder to a portion of the client's net recovery or, more typi-
cally, a multiple of the initial advance.75 Although no legal
impediment exists, commercial TPF providers simply do not
employ the "loan-like" model universally employed by LTPF
providers, and vice versa. This may be a result of historical
accident and path-dependency, as well as of other contingent
factors such as the fact that commercial TPF arose out of the
efforts to treat litigation rights like securities.76 Commercial
TPF and LTPF share the same legal DNA-they are both the
sale of a general intangible, as the UCC would describe it. 77
But commercial TPF looks like, and behaves like, venture capi-
tal or some other form of investment vehicle, while LTPF looks
like, and behaves like, a subprime debt product. 78
(2014) (summarizing studies in which consumers did not understand, inter alia,
compounding interest).
75 See Victoria A. Shannon, Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation Funding Regu-
lation, 36 CARDOZO L. REv. 861, 894 (2015) ("In fact, the funder often calculates its
rate of return as a multiple of the amount invested rather than a percentage of the
amount recovered.").
76 The earliest attempt at modem commercial TPF may be the 1976 attempt
by an attorney to raise funds for an antitrust suit by selling shares in the suit to
investors. See Daniel C. Cox, Lawsuit Syndication An Investment Opportunity in
Legal Grievances, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 153, 154-55 (1990); see also Donald L.
Abraham, Investor-Financed Lawsuits: A Proposal to Remove Two Barriers to an
Alternative Form of Litigation Financing, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1297, 1297, 1302-03
(1992) (describing efforts in the 1980's at lawsuit syndication).
77 U.S. Claims, Inc. v. Flomenhaft & Cannata, LLC, 519 F. Supp. 2d 515, 528
(E.D. Pa. 2007) ("'General intangibles' are defined in Article 9 of the UCC as 'any
personal property, including things in action, other than accounts.' The official
commentary further makes clear that 'general intangible' is a residual category
intended to serve as a catchall for various types of collateral which are not other-
wise specifically defined in Article 9.") (citing UCC § 9-102(a)(42) and UCC § 9-
102, cmt. 5(d)). TPF contracts are simply contracts to purchase contingent pro-
ceeds arising from choses in action. See Devon IT v. IBM Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 184278 at *15-*16 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2013) (discussing commercial TPF
contracts). while some courts have held that consumer TPF contracts create
consumer debt, this view is widely rejected. See Victoria Shannon Sahani, Re-
shaping Third-Party Funding, 91 TuL. L. REv. 405, 411 n.30 (2017) ('The vast
majority of states that regulate third-party funding do not characterize third-party
funding as a loan, but Colorado provides a notable exception.") (citing Oasis Legal
Fin. Grp., LLC v. Coffman, 361 P.3d 400 (Colo. 2015)).
78 Compare Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 9, at 463-65
(commercial TPF as venture capital), with Hashway, Litigation Loansharks, supra
note 18, at 778-83 (consumer TPF as usurious lending).
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The results of this study suggest that, although the actual
cost of capital to consumers is less than many critics believe,
the design of the LTPF contract is different from the design of
commercial litigation contracts in ways which are hard to ex-
plain or justify. For example, why, if LTPF is essentially the
same "product" as commercial TPF, is the former priced like a
loan and the latter priced like a contingent property interest?
This question is especially pointed given that the consumer
shopping for LTPF has already had direct experience with one
form of contingent property contract-the contingent fee agree-
ment he or she (presumably) already signed before securing,
and in order to secure, his or her LTPF. We cannot prejudge
whether LTPF contracts should resemble commercial TPF con-
tracts in price. We want to suggest that, rather than focus
entirely on the price of LTPF, reformers should focus on why
the industry has collectively added to their basic price addi-
tional cost-generating features such as nonrecourse processing
fees, various types of compounding, minimum interest periods,
and buckets-features found in neither commercial TPF nor
the standard contingent fee offered by lawyers to their
clients. 
79
Starting with compounding, it is not clear what the eco-
nomic rationale for it is in our context. According to a famous
urban legend, it is claimed that Albert Einstein stated that
compound interest is "the greatest invention of mankind" or
"the most powerful force in the universe."80 To be clear, com-
pound interest has been around for hundreds of years, perhaps
even more, and yet, it is not clear why we have it at all instead
of converting it to a simple (albeit higher) interest. One possible
explanation is that compound interest reflects the fact that the
investor has the right to claim the principal plus the accrued
interest on any given day and then reinvest the total sum. Take
79 Contingent fees are controversial in their own right and have been the
subject of debate for decades. See Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contin-
gency: A Monopoly of Champions or a Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
625, 625-28 (1995). It is possible that the conventional price for plaintiffs legal
representation for consumers-between 30% and 40% of net recovery-is, in
effect, much higher than the real cost of consumer TPF reported in this study
(56% of every dollar advanced). That is not the point. The point is to ask why
consumer TPF is priced so differently than a lawyer's contingent fee, given that the
two products offer overlapping (but not identical) services. See id. at 653 (discuss-
ing the various products "bundled" into a contingent fee, which include, among
other things, consumer credit).
80 David Mikkelson, Einstein and Compound Interest, SNOPES (Apr. 19, 2011),




for example a simple CD bank account. The client can, on any
day, withdraw the money with the interest accrued and rein-
vest it. To avoid the transaction costs associated with repeat
withdrawals and reinvestments, banks compound the interest
rate they pay their clients holding CD accounts on a daily ba-
sis. It is hard to see, however, how this rationale carries to
LTPF, as the funder does not have the right to demand early
repayment and reinvest the money. In fact, the contingent na-
ture of the transaction means that the funder has no right to
recall its investment until after the client wins at trial or re-
ceives a settlement. Therefore, we do not see an economic jus-
tification for not converting the compounded interest to a
simple interest without any compounding.8 1
Next, we are skeptical of the funders' use of buckets and
minimum interest periods. We observe that the buckets func-
tion similar to "early penalties" or "prepayment penalties," fea-
tures known in mortgage lending and cellphone contracts.8 2
However, whereas in mortgage lending and cellphone contracts
one can provide economic justification for such practice, in
LTPF we could not find one. In cell phone contracts the early
penalty enables the provider to offer a free device to its con-
sumers.8 3 This "free" device is being paid by consumers
throughout the length of the contract. In a world without early
penalties, consumers would not be able to get the benefit of a
new device because cell phone companies rely on a consistent
payment schedule to provide the "free" device.84 The economic
rationale for early penalties in mortgage lending is different. In
the mortgage lending world, the reason for the early penalties
stems from the advantage the borrower has over the lender vis-
d-vis changes in interest rates.85 Because clients have always
81 We are aware of the fact that compounded interest applies in many other
contexts which also cannot be justified by the explanation we provided above, i.e.,
the investor's right to recall her investment. We leave the Job of Justifying com-
pound interest rate in these contexts-home mortgage, home equity loans, credit
card accounts, and more-to others.
82 See e.g., CFPB, What is a Prepayment Penalty? (Sept. 25, 2017), https://
www.consumerftnance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-prepayment-penalty-en- 1957/
[https://perma.cc/DV6X-6HJ6] (describing the practice of, and reasoning be-
hind, prepayment policies in the mortgage industry); Oren Bar-Gill, Consumer
Transactions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465,
465-68, 477 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2014) (pro-
viding the example of "early termination fees in the cell phone market"); see also
In re Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 726 (2011) (striking
early termination fees in cell phone contracts).
83 In re Cellphone, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 733-36.
84 Id.
85 See CFPB, supra note 82.
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the option to refinance, lenders worry about adverse selection
(or de-selection). Specifically, lenders worry that borrowers
refinance whenever the interest rate goes down, whereas lend-
ers do not have a symmetric option to force a refinance when
interest rates go up. The early penalty fee compensates lenders
for the risk of decreasing interest rates and consumers' respon-
dent refinancing. Reviewing the rationales for early penalties
in both cellphone and mortgage contracts, we cannot see any
purpose for buckets and minimum interest periods in LTPF
other than that they allow the funder to present a lower "head-
line" monthly rate.
Third, we show that the pricing of consumer litigant fund-
ing is dynamic after the initial price is set, at the end of the life-
cycle of the funding relationship. After the resolution of the
consumer's case, there is a widespread practice of underpay-
ment by the consumer to the funder. See Chart 7. More than
half of the consumers who receive funding pay less than the
amount due agreed at contract. There is a significant gap be-
tween the amount that the funder gets the consumer to prom-
ise to pay upon contracting (the embedded rate) and the
amount that the funder receives upon resolution of the con-
sumer's case (the effective rate). The embedded rate may in-
deed be 115% per annum in the median case, while the
effective rate is closer to 43% per annum.
Fourth, we show that lawyers matter in the formation and
execution of the LTPF contract. Lawyers' experiences with
LTPF are correlated with the likelihood that their clients will
have their cases approved for funding; the terms of their fund-
ing ex ante; and the actual markup earned by the funder from
the funding contract expost. Certain lawyers who have formed
very strong relationships with the funder appear to be able to
provide the funder with portfolios of cases in exchange for lower
funding costs to their clients ex ante, while others, who have
less experience with the funder, achieve savings for their cli-
ents by securing cost reductions ex post.
III
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
These four insights into the behavior of the LTPF contract
from initial contact between consumer and funder to the con-




Economics teaches us that market players always respond
to consumers' demand.86 Behavioral economics teaches us
that sophisticated market players respond to the demand gen-
erated by consumers that are imperfectly rational due to vari-
ous cognitive biases.8 7 As a general matter, sophisticated
sellers will seek to decrease the perceived price for the consum-
ers without really decreasing the actual price. As scholars have
long noted, this interaction between market forces and con-
sumers' imperfect rationality often results in contracts that
defer costs to the future and that are more complex than neces-
sary.88 Indeed, that is exactly what we observe in third party
litigant funding.
That costs are deferred to the future seems inherent to the
nature of LTPF and arguably should not be criticized as a trick
funders play on their clients. Whereas in many consumer con-
tracts contingent costs deferred long into the future are under-
estimated by consumers and therefore should be avoided, in
the case of LTPF they actually enable consumers who are oth-
erwise liquidity constrained to cash their legal claim. Indeed, a
major appeal of the transaction to the consumer is exactly its
contingent, nonrecourse nature. However, it seems harder to
explain what the economic justification is for why the process-
ing fees are added to the principal, are compounded with it, are
subject to the same MIP and IB provisions, and are paid back
only when and if the principal is paid back. Why instead does
not everybody-including those who were rejected by the
funder (those who refused the funding, and those who could
not pay back anything)-pay uniform processing fees which
reflect the real processing fees? It seems to us that the best
explanation is behavioral-adding the processing fees to the
principal hides their true cost from the imperfectly rational
client.89
Deferring the fees to the future is not the only type of un-
necessary complexity consumers face. As already mentioned
above, multidimensional pricing (compounding interest, MIP,
IB) is another. We could not find any economic rationale for
these provisions and we therefore estimate that they serve as
tools to reduce the perceived total costs to the consumer. Con-
sumers' cognitive biases simply prevent them from being able
86 Bar-Gill, supra note 82, at 465-68.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 471-75.
89 Id. at 472.
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to price these terms into the perceived total price of the con-
tract, even if they were aware of these terms. But the truth is
that most likely they are not. In fact, we have not encountered
a single person, a lawyer or an academic dealing with this
industry, that was aware of this practice.
Further, the burden on complexity does not fall on all con-
sumers in the same way. The weak ones, usually the poorer
ones, who are even less able than the average consumers to
understand the true nature of the transaction, bear a larger
share of the burden complexity generates. In that sense, com-
plexity is regressive.
But the unnecessary complexity of the contract is not only
harming consumers, especially the poor ones; it is also harm-
ing the market for LTPF.90 If consumers are unable to compari-
son shop between contracts in a meaningful way, competition
is hindered. And hindered competition creates monopoly
prices and reduces total welfare. Further, another inefficiency
stems from the fact that when consumers do not fully perceive
the real price of the contract, they might well enter into a trans-
action which costs them more than it is worth to them.9 1
So what should be done? As we already mentioned above,
the controversy surrounding consumer litigant funding in-
cludes calls for various types of consumer protection. The two
leading approaches are (a) to insist on greater clarity in the
contracts or (b) to place caps on the maximum amount that a
funder may charge as a per annum interest against the ad-
vance.92 We think there are better ways to protect consumers.
First, policy makers can prohibit contract terms that are likely
to conceal the embedded interest rate from the consumer. The
embedded interest rate is a result of four features that may
present jointly or severally in the funding contract: daily,
monthly, or annual compounding; investment buckets; mini-
mum interest periods; and processing fees advanced on a non-
recourse basis. Together, these produce an opaque pricing
system that converts what seems to be a simple expected pre-
mium of 45% for the typical advance for fourteen months (3.2%
per month) to an embedded rate of 115% in the median case.93
As was already mentioned, we could not find an economic
rationale for the compounding, MIP, IB and contingent fees.
90 Id. at 475.
91 After all, consumers may have alternatives to LTPF, such as credit cards or
other subprime debt instruments, or early settlement.
92 Bar-Gill, supra note 82, at 475.
93 See supra subpart I.C.
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We therefore think they need to be prohibited. Prohibiting spe-
cific terms is not a novel idea; it is done in various places in the
world. In the United States, early termination fees are re-
stricted in similar contexts, such as early termination fees in
cellphone and mortgage contracts (where they are called pre-
payment penalties), as well as late fees in credit cards
contracts.94
A softer way to regulate LTPF is to set default rules that
eliminate complexities. Under this approach, funders who
would like to restore complexity to their contract will have to
specifically inform consumers about it and require their sepa-
rate consent to such an opt-out.9 5 We are skeptical, however,
that such a solution will change anything on the ground. Our
prediction is that funders will opt out of the default rules and
that imperfectly rational consumers will not understand the
implications of such a move for their welfare.
Another soft way to regulate the market is by improving
disclosure. As was mentioned above, various legislatures have
played with disclosure reforms. These reforms require greater
transparency to the consumers of the various complexities in
the contract. For example, many states require disclosure
about the compounding mechanism or the fees. But there is
another option. Policy makers can require funders to provide
consumers with a single figure that fully reflects the annual
rate. This number, akin to APR in credit cards and mortgage
markets, should reflect all complexities in the contract.96 Such
a number will enable consumers to better estimate what the
transaction is worth to them, as well as to better comparison
shop. Indeed, credit card reforms went in this direction.
However, as appealing as it may sound, operationalizing it
in LTPF is much harder. Whereas in credit cards the APR
basically collapses compounded interest and fees into a simple
figure, in LTPF the contract is more complex. Consumers have
limited control over when their case will conclude; furthermore,
because of the buckets, a delay in the conclusion of a case may
dramatically increase the "APR."97 Therefore, policy makers
who support an APR-like approach to LTPF should at least
prohibit MIP and lB.
Another potential way to mitigate this problem is to provide
consumers with statistical information on how similarly situ-
94 Bar-Gill, supra note 82, at 477 n.6.
95 Id. at 483-84.
96 Id. at 479.
97 See supra Table 3.
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ated consumers have performed in the past. For example, the
funder could inform the client in the following way: clients that
have taken similar amounts to yours, and that have been sub-
ject to the same terms as yours, have ended up repaying us
after X months an amount which is tantamount to $1,500 for
every $1,000 advanced to them. Indeed, similar disclosures
have been proposed in payday loans, credit cards, mortgage
loans, and cell phones.98
Here, again, one may fear that funders will find creative
ways to offset the benefits of this requirement. We therefore
recommend the more paternalistic solution of prohibiting any
contract terms that affect price other than a simple interest
rate. In other words, compounding, minimum interest periods,
interest buckets, and contingent processing fees would be pro-
hibited.99 These prohibitions should be enforced by adminis-
trative fines or punitive damages for those funders who put
them in the contract.
B. Legal Ethics
This Article demonstrates that the effective interest rate
paid by consumers in completed cases is very different from the
interest rate embedded in the contract before those cases are
completed. We know more about the process that generated
the median embedded interest rate than the effective interest
rate, since every consumer within our study had to receive
terms from the funder (although we do not know how many of
those consumers dickered over those terms). 0 0 We know less
about the process that generated the effective rate because not
98 Bar-Gill, supra note 82, at 481.
99 Three further points. First, we are not convinced that processing fees
should be absolutely prohibited, just those that are contingent on the outcome.
Second (and by extension of the prohibition on compounding), the consumer
should be charged the processing fee at the time it is incurred. Finally, we observe
that there are further, even more paternalistic steps that could be taken that we
have chosen to forego. For example, Maya Steinitz has proposed that, at the
conclusion of a consumer's case, the court review the liens on the client's funds in
escrow to ensure that the client's net recovery is no less than 50% of the proceeds,
net the lawyer's legal fee and the funder's right to payment under the LTPF
contract. If the client would receive less than 50%, then the funder's right to
payment would be capped at an amount to ensure that the client received at least
50%. See Maya Steinitz, Testimony on Third Party Financing of Lawsuits (U. Iowa
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2018-11), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3178963
[https: //perma.cc/4TSY-X57K].
lOO We know, for example, that there seems to be a correlation between the
terms offered by the funder to clients whose cases are funded depending on
whether the clients are connected with lawyers who are one-timers, repeat play-
ers, or mega-players. See supra subpart I.E.
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every consumer received a haircut. Of the 32,781 consumers
who paid the funder back at least the advance they received,
18,799-more than half-got haircuts of varying degrees.10 1
We assume that the funder did not offer the concession without
a rational motivation. The most likely motivation is that the
consumer balked at paying the full price to which she had
agreed. Perhaps some consumers balked at settlement be-
cause they received a lower net recovery (after paying their
lawyers and liens) than they had expected and wanted to in-
crease their own net recovery at the funder's expense.
The prevalence of the haircuts and their role in bringing
the actual interest rate down to the levels we have demon-
strated seems to point to an important and hidden role of the
consumer's lawyer in the funding relationship after the funding
contract has been negotiated and signed by the consumer.
This study has already pointed to strong circumstantial evi-
dence that the funder cared about the identity of the lawyer
connected to the cases it funded; as seen in Subpart I.E, the
funder treated clients of one-timers, repeat players, and mega-
players very differently at every stage of the funding process.
This section assumes that differential treatment, when it oc-
curs, is not the result of unilateral decisionmaking by the
funder, but of bilateral negotiation between the funder and the
lawyer on behalf of her client. This section asks, to the extent
that the lawyer is playing an active role in securing advanta-
geous treatment for her client, what, if any, are the lawyer's
obligations to that client and to all her other clients similarly
situated?
A lawyer can assist her client in applying for or receiving
funding. 10 2 A lawyer is obliged to "exercise[ ] independent pro-
fessional judgment" and "render candid advice" if asked by the
client about LTPF. 10 3 One New York case, focusing on the back
end of the client's relationship with a funder, has held that
unless separately negotiated, a lawyer's scope of representation
does not include advocating for the client in her business deal-
ings with a funder. 10 4
101 See supra Chart 7c.
102 See, e.g., Ohio Supreme Court Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline,
Op. 2012-3; New York City Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 2011-02 (2014) (detailing obli-
gations of lawyer whose client requests assistance in obtaining consumer TPF).
103 See New York City Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 2011-02 (2014).
104 Francis v. Mirman, Markovits & Landau, P.C., No. 29993/2010 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Kings Cty. Jan. 3, 2013). The client, who settled his case for $150,000, paid
his lawyer a contingent fee of $50,000; had expenses of $2,211 and owed two TPF
firms $98,415 arising from two advances totaling $27,000. The client alleged that
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A narrow focus on the legal aspects of a client's contract
with a funder entails that a lawyer's ethical obligations are
defined by the scope of representation implied by law in a stan-
dard retainer agreement. Our results suggest that the ethical
obligations of lawyers go further and may include a positive
duty to reasonably protect the financial interests of all of their
clients that secure LTPF from the same funder, regardless of
whether the client asked for additional representation in their
dealings with a funder.
Our analysis is based on the intersection of two principles
in the law of lawyering-the idea that some nonlegal activities
carry with them obligations in their performance similar to
those of legal activities, and the idea that a lawyer faces a
conflict of interest if there is a significant risk that her ability to
represent a client is materially affected by a personal interest.
First, it is likely that LTPF is a "law-related" service as that
term is used in the Rules.105 Rule 5.7, which discusses law-
related services, approaches the issue from the perspective of a
lawyer who provides a law-related service in the context of a
discrete transaction, where the client purchases the service
from the lawyer in a transaction separate from the lawyer's
representation.10 6 The question that arises when a lawyer
secures haircuts for some clients and consciously elects not to
secure them for others is whether there is a risk that the typical
client would "fail[] to understand that the services [securing
haircuts] may not carry with [it] the protections normally af-
forded as part of the client-lawyer relationship."10 7 We think
that this condition is potentially satisfied when the lawyer ne-
his lawyer failed to competently negotiate with two LTPF providers, leaving him
with a net recovery of $111 out of a $150,000 settlement in a personal injury
claim. The court held that the retainer agreement defined a scope of representa-
tion limited to the client's tort action. See also Christine Simmons, Client Sues
Firn After Funders Recover Most of His Settlement, N.Y. L.J., July 19, 2012 (also
discussing the Francis case).
105 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT r. 5.7, cmt. 9 (AM BAR ASS'N 2011) states
that:
A broad range of economic and other interests of clients may be
served by lawyers' engaging in the delivery of law-related services.
Examples of law-related services include providing title insurance,
financial planning, accounting, trust services, real estate counsel-
ing, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social work, psychologi-
cal counseling, tax preparation, and patent, medical or
environmental consulting.
106 See, e.g., Arizona State Bar Comm. on the Rules of Profl Conduct, Formal
Op. 05-01 (2005)) (applying Rule 5.7 to referral of client to investment service in
which the lawyer has a financial interest).
107 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.7, cmt. 9 (AM BAR ASS'N 2011) .
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gotiates on behalf of any client with a funder. 10 8 Negotiating a
smaller payment to the funder, who has a lien on the client's
funds, is a law-related service even if it is not one that lawyer
regularly offers the public and for which she would not charge
separately. We think that this condition is presumptively satis-
fied when the lawyer negotiates on behalf of any client with a
funder but does not, absent any good reason, negotiate on
behalf of another client who has a contract with the same
funder.
Second, if the haircut negotiation of any one client-in-
cluding the decision not to negotiate a haircut on behalf of any
one client-is affected by the lawyer's practice of negotiating
haircuts for her other clients, then Rule 1.7(a)(2) is triggered. ' 0 9
The rule says that a "concurrent conflict of interest exists if...
there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities
to another client ... or by a personal interest of the lawyer.'" 1 0
Typically, this rule is triggered when a lawyer is representing
two clients in legal matters who are also business competitors,
or where the lawyer has a business interest that would be
affected by her representation of a client in a legal matter. But
if Rule 5.7 extends this duty of fair play to matters that are not
strictly speaking legal, but law-related, then the lawyer has a
conflict if the delivery of those law-related services to one client
would materially limit her ability to deliver that service to an-
other client, or if the delivery of the law-related service to a
client would be materially limited by the lawyer's personal in-
terests in the delivery of that service."'
The pattern of haircut negotiations uncovered in this study
indicates a conflict of interest with regard to both other clients
and the lawyer. If the lawyer is only able to secure haircuts for
some clients, but not others, then the decision by the lawyer to
secure a haircut for Peter by definition affects her ability to
secure it for Paula. Further, if the lawyer's ability to secure a
haircut for some clients but not others is determined by her
108 The negotiation of a haircut occurs in the context of the lawyer's fiduciary
duty in connection with the client's proceeds, including the maintenance of an
escrow account for the funds that are delivered by the defendant and the payment
of all other parties who have valid liens which the lawyer is obliged to either pay or
for whose benefit the lawyer must hold funds, in accordance to the law of the
jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: SAFEGUARD-
ING & SEGREGATING PROP., § 44 (Am. Law Inst. 2000).
109 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2018).
110 IJCL
111 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.7, cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2011).
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desire to maintain good relations with the funder, then her
decision not to pursue a really good haircut for Paula (as op-
posed to a merely mediocre haircut, or no haircut at all) means
that the lawyer's personal interests (in managing her practice)
affect Paula.
It should be simple for lawyers to comply with their obliga-
tion under Rule 1.7(a)(2) by securing client consent to the con-
flict as provided for under the rule.1 12 This conflict is one
which should be consentable and is unlikely to interfere with
the lawyer's competent and diligent representation of any of
her clients. 11 3 Among the clients of the mega-players, who al-
ready benefited ex ante from their lawyers' strong relationship
with the funder, it would not be difficult, and it would be fairer,
if the lawyer disclosed to clients upon being retained that if
they received funding with the aid of the lawyer, there was a
one in three chance that they would not enjoy the same oppor-
tunity of a post-settlement haircut that was enjoyed by other
clients similar to them represented by that lawyer.
But this should not be the end of the story. We do not
know why more than half of the typical consumers got hair-
cuts, or how they were calculated, or whether the savings en-
joyed by some could be spread more evenly to all. It seems
premature to assume that the savings could be spread, but it
also seems premature to assume that the current method of
distributing the savings-ad hoc negotiations by the lawyers
after the case is concluded-is the best way to ensure the wel-
fare of the class of consumers who use LTPF. Full disclosure,
which Rule 1.7 would require, seems like a good first step.
Nothing would prevent state regulators from taking further
steps and requiring the funders to explain how decisions to
grant haircuts are made. A regulator could demand that the
funders treat the LTPF consumer in a nondiscriminatory fash-
ion after their case has been concluded. At the very least,
transparency would promote competition among the funders,
resulting in improved consumer welfare.
CONCLUSION
LTPF is an old idea that has become new again. As legal
practice becomes more market-driven, it is inevitable that liti-
gation will be commodified and legal claims will be, at least
112 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2018).
113 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT r. 1.7(b) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2018) (describ-




partially, bought by third parties. This Article has examined
the behavior of only one part of the market in litigated claims-
one occupied by vulnerable, less-sophisticated consumers. It
is a market which, like many consumer markets, may need to
be regulated.
This Article shows that the deals struck between consum-
ers and funders are both better and worse for the consumer
than has been reported by academics and in the media-the
interest rates are not as high as reported, while the simplicity
of the contract is not as good as was thought.
One may argue that a consumer in TPF is not a borrower
(because a nonrecourse loan is not a loan) but rather that he is
selling an asset (or a portion of an asset). If correct, there are
no obvious parallels for policymakers to use to measure
whether the market for these claims is in need of intervention
through some kind of regulatory mechanism, because sellers'
protection law is yet to be developed. According to the selling-
of-an-asset account of the transaction, we show that the me-
dian consumer sells $3,380 of his future contingent proceeds
from his lawsuit in return for a sum of $2,250 he can use
immediately, and, in exchange, transfers to the funder (the
buyer) a 12% risk that he will never deliver the future proceeds,
as well as the risk he will deliver only a portion of them in
fourteen months. On this view, comparisons with subprime
debt and payday lending are less relevant, as LTPF might really
be a hybrid between a sale and a loan, and as such, should be
approached with an open mind based on accurate data.
However, from a more substantive point of view, what mat-
ters is not whether clients are, from a formalistic legal perspec-
tive, sellers or borrowers (or a hybrid) but rather that they are
unsophisticated individuals dealing with sophisticated repeat
players. As such, they need protection, and regardless of what
is used as a point of comparison, any discussion must start
with an accurate picture of the typical price paid for consumer
litigation claims, and we provide that.
This Article provides some of the data that is necessary for
a clear-eyed analysis of the reforms that should be adopted,
depending on the goals sought by the state and the bar. The
two most important findings of this Article, we believe, are,
first, that funders confuse consumers by applying a mul-
tidimensional pricing scheme which includes fees, buckets,
and compounding interest. Second, that what we call the "em-
bedded interest rate"-which is the figure featured in every
media and academic account of LTPF-is not the "effective in-
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terest rate." The effective interest rate-the average premium
actually paid by the consumer and actually earned by the
funder-is 50% for the median advance of fourteen months,
which is smaller than the hundreds of percent the media likes
to cite. We also explain why these two rates differ by focusing
on the role played by ex post haircuts, which are practices
hidden from view. The fact that some clients essentially cross-
subsidize others has unknown distributional effects.
It is possible that removing the complexity at the front end
would not lead to a reduction in the number of haircuts negoti-
ated at the back end of the funding cycle, but it might reduce
the indeterminacy of the size of those haircuts. If the real price
of consumer litigant funding is, on average, closer to 43% per
annum for the median case, it seems to us that both consum-
ers and funders would benefit from having that fact known as
clearly and transparently as possible. Moreover, consumers
will also benefit from knowing they have a 54% chance of pay-
ing about 60% interest for their loan, about a 34% chance of
paying 55% interest for their loan, and a 10% chance of paying
nothing.
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